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Abstract 
This paper analyses the impact of credit rating changes from two aspects. Firstly, 
credit rating will impact company capital structure decisions. It is found that 
companies generally issue more debt when forecasting a credit downgrade to 
take the advantage of the relatively low cost of capital, while a small number of 
firms keep corporate structure unchanged due to flexibility concerns. Secondly, 
there is an offset pattern in daily abnormal returns and volatility of stock returns 
increases after a credit rating change event. Specifically, downgrade has a 
bigger impact on stock performance.  
 
Keywords: Credit Rating, Capital Structure, Financial Flexibility, Stock Return 
Volatility 
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Executive Summary 
Credit rating is a statistical method to measure the likelihood of default by 
the borrower. Its impact on the company or the market is not always clear or 
easy to predict. On the one hand, credit rating changes have an unavoidable 
impact on managers’ capital structure decision. On the other hand, changes in 
credit rating affect market’s expectation on the company’s stock performance and 
thus lead to return volatility. This paper analyses the impact of credit rating 
changes from these two perspectives.  
Firstly, capital structure is one of the most important decisions made by 
modern firms. A proper capital structure helps companies achieve financial 
targets and acquire high returns for equity holders. It is such an important 
concept that numerous scholars have focused their studies on this topic using 
various research methods. One of the commonly agreed conclusions is that 
companies normally reduce debt financing activities before anticipated 
downgrades and take no action before upgrades.  
However, some firms that follow this behavior path may do so out of 
concern for financial flexibility. Our study shows that firms such as these are less 
likely to increase debt financing dramatically before potential downgrades.  
 Secondly, we analyse the effects of credit rating change on companies’ 
stock performance. Through an event study, we calculate cumulative abnormal 
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returns for Canadian companies that were either downgraded or upgraded in the 
previous three years and conclude that changes to credit rating increase return 
volatility. 
Our study differs from previous works from the following aspects: firstly, 
we use credit rating and financial flexibility to explain companies’ decisions that 
cannot be explained by traditional theories. We categorize companies into 
industries to study their capital structure. Secondly, different from Paterson and 
Gauthier’s research (Paterson & Gauthier, 2013), which focused on GIIP and 
Bric countries national stock market performance, we analyze the impact of 
Canadian corporate credit ratings on individual companies’ stock returns. 
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1: Background 
1.1 Traditional theories 
The trade-off theory claims the existence of an optimal leverage ratio of 
corporations.  In other words, an optimal point exists where the benefits and 
costs of using debt are balanced. Firms often set the optimal leverage point as a 
ruler for their capital structure and if any deviation occurs, firms will gradually 
move back to it. (Singh, Priyanka; Kumar, Brajesh, 2012)  
Pecking order theory demonstrates that firms prefer to fund their projects 
or expansion plans with their internal funding. Their next financing option would 
be issuance of new debt. Firms won’t issue equity until they run out of their debt 
capacity and equity is their last resource of capital. (Singh, Priyanka; Kumar, 
Brajesh, 2012) 
1.2 Credit rating 
1.2.1 Credit Rating–Capital Structure Hypothesis (CR-CS) 
Credit Rating - Capital Structure theory claims that CFOs make changes 
on firms’ capital structure by issuing less debt when they see possible upgrades 
or downgrades. They tend to act this way in order to forestall credit ratings 
downgrade. Kisgen, in his study, observes that companies in the top 30% and 
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bottom 30% in terms of debt to capital ratio within a stratum, which are more 
likely to be downgraded and upgraded, issue relatively less debt than companies 
in the middle of the same rating level. Also, CR-CS theory applies to companies 
in all strata. (Kisgen, Credit Ratings and Capital Structure, 2006) 
1.2.2 Information Gap Arguments 
Information gap arguments also state that CFOs make changes to 
companies’ capital structure facing downgrades, but the decision made is in the 
opposite direction. More specifically, firms tend to issue more debt when 
foreseeing possible downgrades. On the other hand, no major changes to capital 
structure are made near upgrades. This is due to the information gap between 
the public and the firm. Before any upgrade/downgrade announcements made by 
credit rating agencies, firms’ managers and credit rating agencies meet and thus 
managers become aware of the possible downgrade/upgrade. However, it takes 
time for the credit rating agencies to announce their decisions and this period 
allows managers to issue more debt if they are anticipating downgrades. (Hung, 
Banerjee, & Meng, 2017) 
1.3 Financial Flexibility 
The impact of financial flexibility on capital structure decisions has not 
been recognized until the comprehensive survey of CFOs performed by Graham 
and Harvey in 2001. Of 4440 sampled firms, 392 responses from CFOs were 
received.  According to the responses, the most important factors to consider 
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when making financing policy are financial flexibility and a high credit rating 
score. They are less concerned about transaction costs, free cash flows, etc. In 
fact, most CFOs respond that financial flexibility is their top concern when making 
capital structure decisions. (Graham & Harvey, 2001) 
Since Graham & Harvey published their findings from the survey on CFOs, 
there has been more research on the importance of financial flexibility. However, 
no research focused on the combined effect of credit rating and financial flexibility 
until the study of Agha and Faff in 2014. They argue financially flexible firms 
benefit more from credit rating upgrades, while inflexible firms suffer more from 
downgrades. (Agha & Faff, 2014) 
1.4 Effect of Credit Rating Change on Stock Returns 
As for the impact of credit rating change on stock returns, Alexander and 
Delphine show how sovereign credit rating changes affect national stock market 
performances in GIIPS and BRIC countries. They argue that sovereign debt 
downgrades produce negative cumulative abnormal returns for GIIPS countries 
and that the effect is more obvious in small economies compared to big 
economies. (Paterson & Gauthier, 2013) 
1.5 Innovation 
We improve the previous research by the following aspects: firstly, when 
evaluating the impact of credit rating change on company capital structure 
decisions, we take financial flexibility into consideration. Secondly, we focus on 
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Canadian corporate stocks rather than country sovereign bonds. We run 
regression and simulate returns of individual securities instead of market indices. 
We exclude financial industry from our research and include both upgraded and 
downgraded companies.  
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2: Research Questions and Analysis  
When comparing different corporate finance theories, we find some 
contradictions and conflicts among them. For example, Pecking Order Theory 
claims that companies prefer internal financing, and then debt. Companies only 
consider equity financing when running out of debt capacity. Trade-Off Theory 
indicates that although debt functions as a tax shield, heavy debt may put 
bankruptcy pressure on companies. Thus, companies should only employ debt 
up to an optimal level.  
Realistically though, deciding on financing strategies is much more 
complex than simply following theoretical models. Numerous internal and 
external factors must be taken into consideration such as credit rating and 
financial flexibility. Conflicts always exist between different scholars who have 
different theories and empirical proof. Therefore, this paper aims to study various 
theories and based on the data we collect, we analyse the impacts of credit rating 
change on a corporation’s capital structure and stock returns.    
2.1 Credit Rating 
Benefits of upgrades and costs of downgrades directly affect managers’ 
capital structure decisions. CR - RS theory stated that companies tend to issue 
less net debt relative to net equity than firms not near a rating change. 
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Companies’ goals are to either avoid a downgrade or increase the chances of an 
upgrade.  
 However, numerous counterexamples inspire us to reconsider the validity 
of the CR-RS theory. Imperial Metals is a firm operating in the materials industry. 
It was downgraded on July 7th, 2017. In contrast to the CR-RS theory, their 
debt/capital level experienced a great increase from 27.58% to 88.89% prior to 
the downgrade. Another example is Macy’s, a US consumer discretionary 
company which was downgraded on February 22nd, 2017. A quarter before the 
downgrade was announced, its debt/capital was four times larger than it was one 
year before the downgrade. Besides these two companies, we can find similar 
corporations in other industries as well.  
These findings lead us to the second theory—Information Gap Arguments. 
This theory states that historically, companies tend to increase their debt portion, 
mainly through new debt issuance before being downgraded by a rating agency. 
This behavior can be explained by the desire to take advantage of the overpriced 
debt and to borrow additional money at a relatively low cost. However, it seems 
that corporations don’t take any actions before upgrade announcements.  
To verify which argument has better empirical support, we implement the 
following data collection process: we use 2,500 US and Canadian publicly traded 
companies, all of which were either downgraded or upgraded in the previous 10 
years.  
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Table 2-1 Descriptive Statistics of 2,500 Selected Companies 
 
 
Companies D/C 1Q Before 
Credit Change 
Mode 0.49 
Median 0.55 
Mean 0.59 
Standard Deviation 0.29 
Kurtosis 3.89 
Range 1.69 
Minimum 0.12 
Maximum 1.81 
Count 2500 
Largest (1) 1.81 
Smallest (1) 0.12 
 
 
The ratio we use to measure their financing structure is the debt-to-capital 
ratio. Each company’s debt-to-capital level was collected for two periods: the first 
period is one year ahead of the rating change and the second period is one 
quarter before the rating change. Generally, companies’ managers can forecast 
the change one quarter before the rating change event due to their superior 
knowledge of the company. We then calculate the change rate of the ratio and 
the percentage of firms whose debt-to-capital ratio fluctuates by 2%, 5%, and 
10%. 
 
 
Companies D/C 1Q After Credit 
Change 
Mean 0.56 
Median 0.65 
Mode 0.62 
Sample Variance 0.07 
Kurtosis 1.74 
Range 1.37 
Minimum 0.14 
Maximum 1.51 
Sum 58.98 
Count 2500 
Largest (1) 1.51 
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Figure 2-1 Change in Debt Financing Proportion 
 
 
 
 
 
It can be seen from Figure 2-1 that one quarter before the downgrade was 
announced, about 70% of the companies decided to increase their debt financing 
proportion and nearly half of the firms increased more than 10% of their debt-to-
capital ratio. On the other hand, firms tend to take no action before a foreseeable 
upgrade: more than 50% of the firms maintained a quite stable debt level (within 
2% change rate) and if we increase the range to 5%, 70% of the corporations 
maintain a stable capital structure. These findings align with the Informational 
Gap Arguments. 
Before Downgrade: Debt Financing  
Debt/Cap Increased  69% 
1Q Before Downgrade 
Before Upgrade: Debt Financing 
1Q Before Upgrade 
56% 
Debt/Cap Change Within 2% 
45% 
1Q Before Downgrade 
Debt/Cap Increased more 
 than 10% 
1Q Before Upgrade 
70% 
Debt/Cap Change Within 5% 
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However, it cannot be ignored that a number of companies’ action don't 
fall into this behavior. This finding inspires us to discover other factors that 
managers consider when they decide financing strategies, and financial flexibility 
comes to our mind first. 
2.2 Financial Flexibility 
Financial flexibility is companies’ ability to meet unexpected cash needs in 
a timely manner. Main sources of financial flexibility include unused debt 
capacity, cash, and lines of credit. Factors that have a significant impact on firms’ 
flexibility include growth, profitability, effective cost of holding cash, cost of 
external financing and dividend payout policy.  
In the previous analysis on credit rating change, we find that even though 
most firms tend to increase debt level when anticipating a potential credit 
downgrade, 30% of them choose to keep their capital structure unchanged. We 
categorize firms according to the following matrix as shown in Figure 2-2. Firms 
with high debt-to-asset ratio and low cash-to-asset ratio are defined as financially 
inflexible firms, otherwise, they are regarded as flexible firms. 
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Figure 2-2 Financial Flexibility Matrix 
 
2.2.1 Data Collecting and Processing  
Here we use the same data set as in the previous section. Among the 
firms which didn’t change their debt-to-capital ratio significantly when facing 
credit downgrade, 72% are flexible firms. The ratio is even larger in sectors such 
as Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Information Technology and 
Telecommunication Services, with a ratio of 85%, 83%, 85% and 87% 
respectively. However, this ratio is quite low in Utilities sector, which is only 40%. 
2.2.2 Conclusion 
Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Information Technology and 
Telecommunication Services industries exhibit higher than average financial 
flexibility because these industries typically use less leverage and thus are more 
Debt	to	Asset 
Cash	to	
Asset 
Hi
gh
 
Low 
Lo
w
 
High 
Flexible Flexible 
Flexible Inflexible 
  11 
flexible than industries like Financial or Energy. These industries enjoy stable 
cash inflows due to the nature of their products, which are non-cyclical products 
or services. Information Technology industry is also flexible because of their high 
growth potential and high profitability. On the other hand, Utilities sector’s 
financial flexibility is below average. Although this sector has a stable income 
from services provided, such as gas and electricity, it is capital-intensive and 
needs to leverage its assets to raise capital for facilities maintenance or 
expansion projects.  In conclusion, when anticipating a credit rating downgrade, 
financially flexible firms are less likely to largely change their debt ratio.  
2.3 Credit Rating On Stock Performance 
2.3.1 Data Selection 
This study focuses on long-term issuer rating change events announced 
by Standard & Poor’s over a 3-year period starting from November 2014. 48 
upgraded companies and 51 downgraded companies were randomly selected 
and all of them are traded on Toronto Stock Exchange.  
In this research, the financial industry is excluded during data collection 
process because of their highly regulated and leveraged characteristics.  This is 
a common practice to ensure that skewed financial fundamentals data don’t 
affect research results. 
For each company, we collect day-to-day total returns starting from one 
year before its rating change date. The database thus contains 100 sets of 
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returns which include historical rating change events and their return fluctuation. 
The data statistics are included in the appendix. 
To run a regression, risk-free rates and market indices data are required.  
Canada 3-month T-bills return data are selected for the same testing period and 
S&P/TSX Composite Index is selected as the market portfolio.   
The descriptive statistics of the data are listed in the following table. 
Table 2-2 Descriptive Statistics for 100 Selected Companies 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.2 Issues pertaining to the data selection 
We exclude financial sector in our research. However, benchmark 
selected by this paper is S&P/TSX Composite Index which includes all 11 GICS 
Descriptive Statistics for Downgraded 
Companies 
  Mean -0.87 
Standard Error 1.67 
Median 0.25 
Standard Deviation 11.96 
Sample Variance 143.04 
Kurtosis 7.41 
Skewness -1.59 
Range 83.44 
Minimum -53.47 
Maximum 29.97 
Sum -44.13 
Largest (1) 29.97 
Smallest (1) -53.47 
Confidence Level (95.0%) 3.36 
Descriptive Statistics for Upgraded 
Companies 
     
 Mean 0.86 
Standard Error 0.74 
Median 0.55 
Standard Deviation 5.14 
Sample Variance 26.43 
Kurtosis 1.21 
Skewness 0.38 
Range 26.20 
Minimum -11.76 
Maximum 14.44 
Sum 41.31 
Largest (1) 14.44 
Smallest (1) -11.76 
Confidence Level (95.0%) 1.49 
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industry sectors. Thus, benchmark returns are impacted by return volatilities and 
fluctuations of financial companies.  
2.3.3 Methodologies 
2.3.3.1 Event Definition 
To test market reaction to credit rating change prediction, we carry out an 
event study. Our study is based on the assumptions that we operate in a well-
diversified market and the investors are rational and risk-averse. Every credit 
rating change is considered as a single event and multiple up/downgrades of the 
same company are considered as different events.  
Our research uses 3-day and 5-day testing windows. The 3-day event 
window ranges from 1 day before the rating change date to 1 day after the rating 
change date, while the 5-day event window ranges from 2 days before the rating 
change date to 2 days after the rating change date. Longer testing windows 
allows our research to cover unusual market reaction delays and to study the 
persistence of abnormal returns. However, a longer testing window may 
decrease the significance of abnormal returns and can lead to less accurate 
results.   
2.3.3.2 CAPM model 
In this paper, the CAPM model is used to forecast company stock returns. 
For each company, 252 days of daily stock returns before the event window are 
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used to forecast the 5-day or 3-day event window daily returns. The formula for 
calculating the expected return of an asset given its risk is as follows: 𝑟"# = 	 𝑟& +	𝛽"	(𝑟* − 𝑟&) 
Where, 
𝑟& = 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘	𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝛽" = 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎	𝑜𝑓	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟* = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 
2.4 Beta estimation 
Beta is calculated by dividing the covariance of the return of an asset with 
the return of the benchmark by the variance of the return of the benchmark over 
the period from T-252-n to T-n, where n is the number of days before or after the 
event.  
𝛽A = 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒	(𝑟#"DEFGHI, 𝑟*)𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒	(𝑟*)  
 
2.4.1.1 Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
The formula to estimate the cumulative abnormal return is as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = (𝑟"#MNOPMNQP − 𝑟RD) 
where, 
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𝑇T 	= 	𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦	𝑔𝑜𝑡	𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑜𝑟	𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑛		 = 	𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠	𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒	𝑜𝑟	𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝑟"# = 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦	𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘	𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑟RD = 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑	𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙	𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦	𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘	𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 
2.4.2 Results Testing 
 After determining cumulative abnormal returns for each company, it is 
necessary to test if they are statistically significant. We set the null hypothesis H0 
that cumulative abnormal returns are equal to zero and calculate t-statistics as  
𝑡 = 	 𝐶𝐴𝑅 − 0𝑠𝑡𝑑(𝐶𝐴𝑅)/ 𝑁 
 where, 
N = number of underlying securities 
 The calculated t-statistic is compared with the corresponding t-value from 
the two-tailed t-distribution table with 95% confidence interval. However, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected based on the calculation.  
By taking a closer look into the CAR data set, it can be found that there 
exists an offset pattern between the cumulative abnormal return of each security 
and thus the total CAR is not significantly different from zero for both upgraded 
and downgraded companies.  
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Figure 2-3 Max & Min Abnormal Return Comparison 
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 Therefore, for each security, volatility of daily estimated returns is 
calculated and compared with the volatility of daily actual returns. The conclusion 
is made that overall, credit rating upgrade does not have too much impact on 
stock returns. However, credit rating downgrade will significantly increase return 
volatility, as indicated in Figure 2-4. 
 
Figure 2-4 Return Volatility Comparison 3-day Event Window 
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3: Conclusion 
 Numerous scholars have been studying the impact of credit rating on 
firms’ financing strategies since 2006 and conflicts exist on how managers react 
if they forecast a change in credit rating in the near future. Based on our 
analyses, we conclude that companies tend to increase their debt financing 
proportion before the downgrade, mainly because the downgrade is unavoidable 
and the best option is to take full advantage of current debt price and to borrow 
additional capital for future. By doing this, a company can benefit from cost 
reduction and profit retention. In contrast, corporations choose to maintain a 
relatively stable debt financing level before an upgrade. Some firms keep their 
capital structure unchanged when forecasting a credit rating downgrade because 
they want to retain financial flexibility for future unexpected incidence.  
Besides the impact of credit rating change on corporate capital structure, 
we also analyse the effects of credit rating change on companies’ stock 
performance. Through an event study, we reach the conclusion that credit rating 
change will increase return volatility. 
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Appendix 1 List of Upgrade Companies 
Company Name Upgraded Date Avg Daily Return Volatility 
Innergex Renewable Energy Inc 2017-11-02 -0.30 0.53 
Lundin Mining Corp 2017-10-20 0.85 1.27 
Teck Resources Ltd 2017-10-12 0.51 0.16 
Hudbay Minerals Inc 2017-09-13 -1.28 2.97 
Paramount Resources Ltd 2017-09-13 2.28 3.74 
Trilogy Energy Corp 2017-09-13 2.42 3.95 
Mitel Networks Corp 2017-09-07 -0.78 0.87 
Brookfield Renewable Partners 
LP 
2017-08-16 0.50 0.35 
Norbord Inc 2017-08-15 -0.48 0.56 
Paramount Resources Ltd 2017-07-07 -0.25 6.04 
Trilogy Energy Corp 2017-07-07 2.60 2.48 
Canadian Natural Resources Ltd 2017-05-05 0.75 2.04 
CES Energy Solutions Corp 2017-03-10 0.28 3.51 
Savanna Energy Services Corp 2017-03-10 -1.54 1.37 
Western Energy Services Corp 2017-03-10 -1.26 1.67 
IAMGOLD Corp 2017-03-07 -1.05 0.63 
Taseko Mines Ltd 2017-03-07 -3.92 2.45 
Vermilion Energy Inc 2017-03-01 0.72 1.92 
Athabasca Oil Corp 2017-02-10 1.92 3.13 
Perpetual Energy Inc 2017-01-25 -3.60 2.25 
Teck Resources Ltd 2016-11-17 0.62 3.02 
Perpetual Energy Inc 2016-11-10 -0.78 4.55 
Hudbay Minerals Inc 2016-10-28 3.00 0.61 
Mercer International Inc 2016-10-20 0.27 1.53 
Perpetual Energy Inc 2016-10-07 0.02 2.69 
Alamos Gold Inc 2016-09-22 -1.26 2.24 
Agrium Inc 2016-09-13 -0.85 2.46 
Air Canada 2016-09-07 -0.29 3.47 
Seven Generations Energy Ltd 2016-07-13 0.10 0.65 
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Company Name Upgraded Date Average Daily 
Return 
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Cascades Inc 2016-06-16 -0.45 3.19 
Waste Connections Inc 2016-06-02 1.77 1.34 
Manitoba Telecom Services Inc 2016-05-02 4.72 9.19 
Mitel Networks Corp 2016-04-20 0.70 1.72 
Suncor Energy Inc 2016-04-18 0.58 2.05 
Waste Connections Inc 2016-01-19 4.81 5.87 
Shaw Communications Inc 2016-01-15 -1.37 2.13 
Seven Generations Energy Ltd 2015-12-17 -0.86 0.72 
Hudson's Bay Co 2015-11-19 -0.05 0.17 
Hudbay Minerals Inc 2015-11-13 -0.17 2.42 
Imperial Metals Corp 2015-08-07 0.68 1.12 
Lightstream Resources Ltd 2015-07-10 -0.92 3.11 
AGT Food & Ingredients Inc 2015-06-12 0.66 3.59 
Lundin Mining Corp 2015-04-23 2.67 1.86 
Alamos Gold Inc 2015-04-13 1.66 4.37 
Ainsworth Lumber Co Ltd 2015-03-31 -1.19 2.64 
Air Canada 2015-02-02 1.84 3.04 
GLENTEL Inc 2014-12-01 -0.91 0.67 
Mercer International Inc 2014-11-12 0.41 1.33 
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Appendix 2 List of Downgrade Companies  
Company Name Downgraded Date Average Daily 
Return 
Annualized Volatility 
Concordia International Corp 2017-09-18 -2.30 0.93 
Aimia Inc 2017-08-14 6.11 3.10 
Imperial Metals Corp 2017-07-07 -4.55 16.70 
Yellow Pages Ltd/Canada 2017-06-20 -1.33 2.08 
DHX Media Ltd 2017-06-08 -1.14 1.28 
Western Energy Services Corp 2017-06-07 -2.55 3.45 
Eldorado Gold Corp 2017-05-26 -1.60 1.60 
Concordia International Corp 2017-05-24 -0.75 1.98 
Aimia Inc 2017-05-12 -17.82 40.57 
Hudson's Bay Co 2017-05-08 0.09 0.84 
New Gold Inc 2017-01-31 -9.58 16.32 
Perpetual Energy Inc 2016-12-12 2.16 1.31 
Calfrac Well Services Ltd 2016-10-07 0.13 3.00 
Bombardier Inc 2016-09-23 -1.23 0.62 
Methanex Corp 2016-09-19 -0.57 1.43 
Trinidad Drilling Ltd 2016-08-26 0.13 0.22 
Baytex Energy Corp 2016-08-12 3.50 1.45 
SunOpta Inc 2016-08-12 2.24 4.95 
Stars Group Inc/The 2016-07-25 0.43 0.45 
Trilogy Energy Corp 2016-06-21 3.26 3.01 
Western Energy Services Corp 2016-06-20 0.14 3.40 
Lightstream Resources Ltd 2016-06-16 -1.15 5.89 
Eldorado Gold Corp 2016-05-16 2.53 2.09 
Lightstream Resources Ltd 2016-05-04 -4.37 16.83 
CES Energy Solutions Corp 2016-04-27 2.03 1.28 
CHC Group Ltd 2016-04-19 0.67 16.28 
Corus Entertainment Inc 2016-04-19 -0.33 1.32 
Perpetual Energy Inc 2016-04-19 -1.02 3.01 
Precision Drilling Corp 2016-03-30 -0.30 0.74 
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Company Name Downgraded Date Average Daily 
Return 
Annualized 
Volatility CHC Group Ltd 2016-03-16 4.76 13.31 
Perpetual Energy Inc 2016-03-11 0.68 14.37 
First Quantum Minerals Ltd 2016-02-26 3.56 1.89 
Kinross Gold Corp 2016-02-18 2.67 5.05 
Teck Resources Ltd 2016-02-12 9.99 15.19 
Paramount Resources Ltd 2016-02-05 -3.08 6.58 
Taseko Mines Ltd 2016-02-04 1.40 1.22 
New Gold Inc 2016-02-02 0.08 4.98 
Hudbay Minerals Inc 2016-02-01 2.62 11.66 
Imperial Metals Corp 2016-01-27 0.83 3.35 
Capstone Mining Corp 2016-01-26 2.35 10.35 
Corus Entertainment Inc 2016-01-13 -1.37 5.84 
Valener Inc 2016-01-11 0.46 0.63 
Centric Health Corp 2015-11-12 -1.69 1.67 
Calfrac Well Services Ltd 2015-10-28 -6.02 3.26 
SMART Technologies Inc 2015-10-20 -1.58 4.31 
Bellatrix Exploration Ltd 2015-10-16 -4.35 3.94 
Alamos Gold Inc 2015-10-08 3.12 2.66 
Teck Resources Ltd 2015-09-30 0.88 5.47 
Mitel Networks Corp 2015-09-21 -0.47 3.07 
IAMGOLD Corp 2015-08-31 0.00 6.94 
Bombardier Inc 2015-08-12 -2.38 2.07 
 
 
 
